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Umberla (2)
de.slideshare.net
UMBRELLA BRANDING AND THE PROVISION OF QUALITY HENDRIK HAKENES MARTIN PEITZ CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION DECEMBER An …
[ ] Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU Council:...
arxiv.org
Authors: Sascha Kurz, Stefan Napel. (Submitted on 10 Mar 2015). Abstract: The new voting system of the Council of the European Union cannot be represented ...
Strategic Power Revisited by Stefan Napel, Mika Widgren :: SSRN
papers.ssrn.com
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for
Napel, Stefan [WorldCat Identities]worldcat.org › identities › lccn-n
worldcat.org
Bilateral bargaining : theory and applications by Stefan Napel( Book ) 15 editions published in in English and German and held by 275 WorldCat member ...
Stefan Napel - Academia.eduindependent.academia.edu › StefanNapel
independent.academia.edu
Stefan Napel studies Economics of Tourism, Evolutionary Economics, and Economic Theory.
[ ] On the Egalitarian Weights of Nations
arxiv.org
Authors: Sascha Kurz, Nicola Maaser, Stefan Napel. (Submitted on 26 Nov 2012). Abstract: Voters from m disjoint constituencies (regions, federal states, etc.) ...
The Nucleolus of Large Majority Games by Sascha Kurz, Stefan Napel,...
papers.ssrn.com
For one of the most prominent solution concepts for cooperative TU games, we show that in the weighted case the nucleolus tends to the weights as the number of
EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 Versus Parliament 6 by Stefan...
papers.ssrn.com
Stefan Napel. University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. Mika Widgren. University of Turku - Department of ...
EP hearings for Commissioners-designate. Additional referenceswww.consilium.europa.eu › library-blog › posts › e...
www.consilium.europa.eu
Full text available; The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations / Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén.
Fair Representation and a Linear Shapley Rule by Sascha Kurz, Nicola...
papers.ssrn.com
When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numb
Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary ...academic.oup.com › article-abstract
academic.oup.com
Stefan Napel. Stefan Napel. Max Planck Institute of Economics, University of Hamburg. Search for other works by this author on:.
The Prediction Value by Maurice Koster, Sascha Kurz, Ines Lindner,...
papers.ssrn.com
Stefan Napel. University of Bayreuth November 29, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper II. Abstract: We introduce the prediction ...
The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional...
papers.ssrn.com
The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibr
SSRN-EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6 by...
www.worldlii.org
SSRN-EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6 by Stefan Napel, Mika Widgren
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